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Abstract: The rapid urban spread of Ebola virus in West Africa in 2014 and consequent breakdown of control
measures led to a significant economic impact as well as the burden on public health and wellbeing. The US
government appropriated $5.4 Billion for FY2015 and WHO proposed a $100 Million emergency fund largely
to curtail the threat of future outbreaks. Using epidemiological analyses and economic modeling, we propose
that the best use of these and similar funds would be to serve as global insurance against the continued threat of
emerging infectious diseases. An effective strategy would involve the initial investment in strengthening mobile
and adaptable capacity to deal with the threat and reality of disease emergence, coupled with repeated
investment to maintain what is effectively a ‘national guard’ for pandemic prevention and response. This
investment would create a capital stock that could also provide access to safe treatment during and between
crises in developing countries, lowering risk to developed countries.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2013–2015 West African Ebola virus disease outbreak
(hereinafter termed ‘‘W. African Ebola outbreak’’) lasted
more than 1 year and was longer and larger (65 times the
next largest historical outbreak) than any prior outbreak,
with 27,678 reported cases in 10 countries and 11,276 re-
ported deaths as of July 15, 2015 (World Health Organi-
zation 2015a, b; Table 1). Most previous outbreaks have
been localized to a single country, and only 7 have caused
more than 100 known cases prior to 2013, with the largest
of these affecting 425 people (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2014; Table 1). The unprecedented scale of
the 2013–2015 outbreak highlights a critical weakness in
our global battle against the threat of pandemics—the lack
of a well-funded, long-term strategy to pre-empt pandemic
emergence. Pandemics originate from sporadic, but fre-
quent emerging disease events that are caused largely by
socioeconomic and environmental changes (Morse et al.
2012). As prior pandemics have occurred, societal response
has included initiatives designed specifically to thwart their
origin and spread, e.g., broadening of the International
Health Regulations (IHR) following the SARS outbreak
(Orellana 2005; Heymann et al. 2015). These initiatives are
often coupled with surges of funding for basic and applied
research to reduce future threats. However, these are often
subject to waning public interest in the inter-pandemic
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intervals between perceived threats. For example, in the
USA, the 2001 anthrax attacks led to a surge of funding to
counter potential bioterrorism agents (‘select agents’)
much of which supported strategies of value to other
pandemic pathogens (Morens et al. 2004; Khan 2011). The
emergence of H5N1 avian flu and H1N1 pandemic flu each
led to funding for the development and purchase of med-
ical countermeasures (vaccines and drugs) and for basic
science and capacity building in countries of high preva-
lence (Collin et al. 2009; Walley and Davidson 2010).
Following the largest ever Ebola outbreak in 2013–2015, the
US President requested $6.18 billion and Congress allo-
cated emergency funding of $5.4 Billion for control and
prevention programs (The White House Office of the Press
Secretary 2014; Mikulski 2015). The World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) announced a $100 million emergency
fund to avoid impacts of future emerging diseases (Reuters
2015). Here we use epidemiological and economic analyses
to examine whether this could be considered another step
in a boom-bust cycle of pandemic threat and response, or
the beginning of a new strategy to pre-empt the repeated
emergence of pathogens with pandemic potential. We then
examine how these funds could be spent to best reduce the
opportunity for future global health emergencies of the
same scale as the 2013–2015 West African Ebola outbreak.
METHODS
Our analysis consists of two components: an epidemio-
logical analysis of factors that may have led to the
unprecedented scale of the West African Ebola virus disease
outbreak, and an economic analysis that uses this infor-
mation to examine optimal self-insurance-cum-protection
(SICP) funding strategies.
Epidemiological Framework
We conducted a basic epidemiological analysis to test two
hypotheses on why the 2013–2015 W. African Ebola out-
break became so large: (1) it originated in a region that was
significantly more densely populated than prior Ebola
outbreaks; or (2) it was already significantly larger than
other Ebola outbreaks at the time of its discovery.
We gathered data on all Ebolavirus outbreaks with over
100 cases (n = 8, including the 2013–2015 outbreak). For
each outbreak, where available (International Commission
1978; WHO/International Study Team 1978; Khan et al.
1999; Okware et al. 2002; World Health Organization 2004;
Kaput 2007; MacNeil et al. 2011), we recorded the initial
location of emergence, date of initial report, initial number
of cases and deaths reported, and total number of cases and
deaths (for the ongoing outbreak, we recorded current
cases and deaths; Table 1). Initial location was taken either
from papers describing the history of the outbreak, from
contemporaneous situation reports, or from ProMED-mail
posts about the outbreak. For each location, where avail-
able, we recorded information on population density, using
a variety of gazetteers and publicly available censuses. This
information was only available for all outbreaks on the level
of regional administrative divisions; many outbreaks oc-
curred in small towns without a definitive ‘‘area’’ listed to
calculate population density, or in villages too small to have
Table 1. Outbreak Data.













ebov1 Nzerekore, Faranah 148,555.0 5,933,479 39.9 2014-03-22 80 59 27,678 11,276
ebov2 Northern 85,391.7 5,148,882 60.3 2000-10-08 51 31 425 224
ebov3 Equateur 403,292.0 4,789,307 11.9 1976-10-19 17 11 318 280
ebov4 Bandundu 295,658.0 4,907,673 16.6 1995-05-10 100 56 315 250
ebov5 Western Equatoria 79,342.7 359,056 4.5 1976-10-29 NA NA 284 151
ebov6 Kasai-Occidental, Bas-Congo 208,662.0 6,172,000 29.6 2007-09-11 372 166 264 187
ebov7 Western 55,276.6 8,229,800 148.9 2007-11-30 50 16 149 37
ebov8 Cuvette-Ouest 26,600.0 72,999 2.7 2003-02-05 61 48 143 128
Data collected for Ebola outbreaks with > 100 cases (including the 2013–2015 outbreak). Columns document the initial location of emergence, area,
population, and population density of region; date of initial report, initial number of cases and deaths reported; and total number of cases and deaths.
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population counts. We used population counts or estimates
closest to the date of the epidemic. We recorded the initial
cases and deaths reported from the first ProMED-mail
posting for each outbreak which contained specific num-
bers of cases and deaths. For all outbreaks except one
(2007, DRC), these numbers were below final counts. The
first two outbreaks of Ebola occurred in 1976, before
ProMED-mail was active. For one of these, we obtained the
initial case count from the paper describing the outbreak;
for the other, no such number could be obtained. Finally,
we examined models of the 2013–2015 epidemic’s early
growth dynamics (Kiskowski 2014) to determine whether
we should expect a linear association between population
density and final outbreak size.
Economic Framework
Our economic analysis is based on a mathematical model
of public risk management in response to the threat of a
pandemic. We describe the general modeling framework
here, with further mathematical details and some analytical
results in an ‘‘Appendix’’. We examine the economic
tradeoffs associated with investments in preventing a dis-
ease outbreak and apply the model to the Ebola case. Un-
like prior analyses that distinguish between ex ante disease
prevention and ex post disease control, e.g. (Berry et al.
2015), we recognize that investments in preventing an
outbreak (e.g., healthcare capacity) may also be useful in
controlling an outbreak should it occur. Investments like
these that reduce both the likelihood of a bad state of
nature (self-protection) and the severity of the bad state
(self-insurance) have been termed self-insurance-cum-
protection (SICP; Lee 1998). Our analysis examines the
economically optimal investment strategy in SICP to ad-
dress future major disease outbreaks and assess whether
there are likely to be significant benefits to such invest-
ments in the case of Ebola-like outbreaks. To do this, we
examine the dynamics and economic impacts of the West
African Ebola outbreak, and use this to analyze the eco-
nomics of its prevention.
Our model makes the preliminary assumption that
urban areas are currently free from an Ebola outbreak, al-
though the occasional random infection may generate a
risk of a major outbreak in one or more areas that could
then spread quickly. The expected economic costs of this
outbreak are referred to as economic damages and denoted
JX(N(t)), which consist of both human health expenditures
and lost productivity and commerce. Damages are
decreasing in a stock of SICP capital N tð Þ; i.e.,
JXN(N(t)) < 0 (Subscripts denote derivatives with respect
to the indicated variable). The capital stock represents the
capacity to reduce the chances of a major outbreak (self-
protection), and to also react rapidly to reduce the eco-
nomic costs of any outbreak that does arise (self-insur-
ance). SICP capital, which will last in the long-term if
appropriately maintained, includes hospitals, lab facilities
and equipment, vehicles, surveillance networks, and
knowledge and human capital.
Following (Berry et al. 2015), we model uncertainty
about a major outbreak event by assuming the outbreak
occurs at some random future date s, which may or may
not materialize. Investments in SICP reduce the likelihood
that s arises. The probability an outbreak occurs at a par-
ticular time t, given it has not yet occurred, is given by the
hazard rate
w b tð Þ;N tð Þð Þ ¼ lim
Dt!0
Pr t  s<t þ Dt s  tjð Þ
Dt
:
The stock of SICP capital reduces the hazard rate,
wN < 0, effectively delaying the timing of an epidemic or
pandemic. The term b(t) denotes the background hazard
rate, which is the hazard rate of an outbreak if there is no
investment in N(t), i.e., w(b(t),0,0) = b(t). Increases in b(t)
increase the hazard rate, wb > 0. The value of b(t) in-
creases over time to a steady-state value b* according to an
exogenous process
_b tð Þ ¼ r b tð Þð Þ; ð1Þ
where r(b(t)) > 0 for b(t) < b*, r(b) < 0 for b(t) > b*,
and r(b*) = 0 (The ‘‘dot’’ notation represents a time
derivative, e.g., _b tð Þ ¼ db tð Þ=dtÞ. These increases in b(t)
are exogenous, reflecting outside factors such as increasing
population densities in urban areas at risk of Ebola, greater
population mobility, and land use changes and other
anthropogenic factors.
Investments in the SICP stock are denoted n(t), so that
the SICP stock changes over time according to
_N tð Þ ¼ n tð Þ  dN tð Þ: ð2Þ
where d represents the depreciation rate. Investments in
SICP, n(t), are expressed in terms of expenditures and have
a unit cost of one. SICP includes a flow of operating costs
related to the existing stock, given by the increasing, convex
function C(N(t)). Operating costs do not include expenses
to offset depreciation, as these are captured by n(t).
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Optimization Problem
We now present the optimization problem from which we
will derive the cost-minimizing SICP investment strategy
with non-constant outbreak risks. Given the economic
values described above, the expected present value (or










Following the transformation used in Reed and Heras
(1992) and Berry et al. (2015), we can write Eq. (3) as the





n tð Þ þ C N tð Þð Þ þ w b tð Þ;N tð Þð ÞJX N tð Þð Þð Þerty tð Þdt
ð4Þ
where y(t) is known as the cumulative hazard (i.e., aggre-
gated over time), with
_y tð Þ ¼ w b tð Þ;N tð Þð Þ: ð5Þ
The cumulative hazard modifies the discount factor
e-rt-y(t) so that the time derivative of the exponent, r +
w(b(t), N(t)), represents a risk-adjusted rate of return.
The cost minimization problem involves choosing a
time path for n(t) to minimize J subject to the dynamic
Eqs. (1), (2) and (5). This problem is solved using the
method of optimal control. This method involves mini-
mizing the conditional current value Hamiltonian
H ¼ n tð Þ þ C N tð Þð Þ þ JX N tð Þð Þ þ q2 tð Þ½ w N tð Þ; b tð Þð Þ
þ q1 tð Þ n tð Þ  dN tð Þ½  þ k tð Þr b tð Þð Þ;
ð6Þ
the minimized value of which is proportional to the min-
imum present value of costs, J. The Hamiltonian includes
three implicit prices or values known as conditional costate
variables: q1(t) represents the value of an additional unit of
SICP capital, q2(t) represents the value of a slight increase
in the cumulative hazard on the discounted value of costs,
and k(t) is value of a slight increase in the exogenous
background hazard. Each of these values is measured in
terms of the impact on costs, so that a positive value reflects
a cost and a negative value reflects a reduction in costs (i.e.,
a benefit). For instance, in ‘‘Appendix’’ we show that
q1(t) < 0 because SICP reduces costs; the marginal benefit
of investments in SICP, - q1(t), optimally equals unity in
an interior solution, thereby balancing this marginal benefit
with the marginal cost of investment. We also show in
‘‘Appendix’’ that - q2(t) is positive and equals discounted
expected costs at time t. This means that q2(t) < 0, as a
larger y(t) in Eq. (4) increases the risk-adjusted discount
rate to reduce discounted expected costs—a benefit. For
brevity, we suppress time notation for all time-dependent
variables.
The net value of an increase in the cumulative hazard is
given by the expression Z = JX + q2 in the Hamiltonian.
Expression Z represents the expected net cost of an out-
break (i.e., outbreak costs JX less the discounted expected
future costs of trying to avoid an outbreak, q2, which are
forgone once an outbreak occurs), or equivalently the ex-
pected cost savings from preventing an outbreak. This va-
lue is optimally nonnegative since society would never want
the expected cost of avoiding an outbreak to exceed the
expected cost of an outbreak. Finally, the price of back-
ground risk, k, is positive because background risk is costly.
In ‘‘Appendix’’, we derive the cost-minimizing
investment plan as a function of the current capital stock
and background risks, n(N,b). Substituting this relation
into Eq. (2) then determines how the SICP stock optimally
changes over time. Before presenting these results, we first
discuss the functional forms and parameter values used in
our numerical analysis.
Functional Forms and Parameters
In general, the cost of an outbreak of a new pandemic
disease is assumed similar to the West African Ebola out-
break, with the emergence of such a novel disease, or re-
emergence of Ebola or another known pathogen, being
inevitable. These assumptions are in line with previous
analyses of trends in disease emergence (Jones et al. 2008;
Morse et al. 2012). Moreover, from our epidemiological
analyses (Table 1; Epidemiological Analysis), and the lit-
erature (e.g., Gostin and Friedman 2015; Heymann et al.
2015), we assume the proximity of the recent Ebola out-
break to a large urban center was an important factor in its
subsequent size, and future outbreaks near urban centers
would have a heightened likelihood of being difficult to
control. Accordingly, our model was parameterized with
basic data (e.g., timing, caseload) from all known previous
Ebola outbreaks, and economic data from the recent West
African outbreak.
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The specific parameterization is a baseline scenario
designed to produce a lower bound for the expected net
benefits of investment in SICP capital, given that we do not
model possible positive spillover effects from healthcare on
development outcomes. We recognize the uncertainty that
exists about many parameter values, and so we also run a
sensitivity analysis.
We first assume a hazard function of the form
w N; bð Þ ¼ bekN ; ð7Þ
where the parameter k is a measure of the effectiveness of
investments in reducing risk. We calibrate k by making an
assumption about how much investment is required to
essentially eliminate risk. We choose k such that, at some
very large expenditure Nmax, an outbreak is expected to
occur only once every 200 years, i.e.,
ekN
max ¼ 0:005; ð8Þ
which could be considered close to eradication—the ulti-
mate form of prevention. Our baseline simulations are
based on Nmax = $7.5 billion, which is 25% larger than
what the USA spent to control the previous outbreak. Our
sensitivity analysis varies this value from $1 billion to $10
billion due to the significant uncertainty about the costs
and efficacy of pathogen prevention campaigns. There is
reason to believe the values will fall within this range,
particularly if we look to related, large-scale public disease
eradication programs for guidance. For example, smallpox
eradication cost roughly $300 million, or $2.1 billion in
2014 dollars. Efforts to eradicate polio have cost roughly $7
billion, and so far roughly $2.3 billion has been spent to
prevent/eradicate malaria (Keegan et al. 2011).
The functional form we adopt for r(b) is




where b is a growth parameter and b* is the maximum
arrival rate of a large-scale outbreak. Our choice of b* is
based on our analysis of prior Ebola outbreaks since the
initial outbreak in 1976 (Table 1 and Epidemiological Re-
sults). Considering only large outbreaks that have reached
urban areas as uncontrolled, only the most recent outbreak
counts as an event. There has been 1 uncontrolled outbreak
in 38 years (the amount of time from the first outbreak to
the present) or a risk of 2.6% annually (World Health
Organization 2014a). We assume b(0) = 0.026. Due to
concerns that background risks are increasing due to in-
creased population densities and movement, we assume
b* = 5% (i.e., a major outbreak once every 20 years). We
calibrate b so that it takes 15 years for b to equal 0.05. We
note that with logistic growth, the trajectory for b asymp-
totes to b*. If we had required b to essentially converge to b*
within 15 years, then b would become extremely close to b*
within only a few years. Our choice of b = 0.95b* within
15 years essentially means b begins to converge to b*
around this time. This requirement implies a baseline value
of b = 0.242.
Now consider the specification of JX(N). We adopt the
form




max  Dminð Þ þ 1 ð10Þ
where Dmax, Dmin, and a are parameters. This specification
results in JX(0) = Dmax and JX(N ? ?) = Dmin. Estimates
of the damages incurred by an outbreak come from the
World Bank’s report (World Bank Group 2014) on the
projected damages of an Ebola outbreak. The baseline
scenario consists of the ‘‘high Ebola’’ case in the World
Bank report where damages are estimated to be $32.6 bil-
lion. Damages are large due to the uncontrolled nature of
the outbreak and include damages from the disease
spreading to neighboring countries. We use this value to set
Dmax = 32.6 billion. The World Bank’s ‘‘low Ebola’’ dam-
age estimates are $3.8 billion, which reflects a scenario in
which the outbreak is contained quickly. We calibrate the
parameter a so that 80% of the potential reduction in
damages occurs for a SICP investment of N = $5 billion,
which is roughly what the USA spent on the last outbreak.
We believe the values in this baseline scenario are conser-
vative. The damage values only represent 2-year estimates
and they only include economic losses from the disease
spreading to neighboring countries. Damages would be
considerably larger, and more difficult and costly to con-
tain, if a pandemic also spread to developed countries.
The last function to specify is the maintenance cost
function C(N), which we adopt as C(N) = aN. We set
a = 0.05 in the baseline, so that operating costs are 5% the
value of capital. Our sensitivity analysis examines a range of
other values.
Finally, our baseline analysis assumes a depreciation
rate of d = 0.05 and a discount rate, or rate of time pref-
erence, of r = 0.03. We do not include a sensitivity analysis
for these parameters. However, the sensitivity of a related
model of preventive investments to both parameters is
included in (Berry et al. 2015) and provides the relevant
insights. This discount rate is consistent with the yield on
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30-year US Treasury bonds (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/DGS30) commonly used as a risk-free rate of
return in the economics literature.We also assume the initial
capital stock is negligible, i.e.,N(0) = 0. Startingwith a larger
capital stock would reduce costs moving forward and it
would alter the timing of investments, but it would not affect
the optimal values of N as b increases over time nor would it
affect steady-state value of N (see ‘‘Appendix’’).
RESULTS
Epidemiological Results
The West African outbreak was initially confirmed as
caused by Ebola virus in March 2014, when 80 cases were
known, centered in the Nzérékoré and Faranah regions of
Guinea with a population density of 39.9 (people/km2). At
this point, the overall outbreak dynamics were not sub-
stantially different from any of the other 7 outbreaks
with > 100 cases. There was no apparent relationship
between the regional population density and final outbreak
size in a linear model or apparent in a scatterplot (Table 2;
Fig. 1). The mean region density for these Ebola outbreaks
was 39.3 (people/km2) and the standard deviation was
48.35. The ongoing outbreak started in a region with a
population density of 39.9, almost exactly the mean value
for this set of outbreaks. Similarly, there was no apparent
relationship between initial reported case counts and final
case counts in a linear model or apparent in a scatterplot
(Table 3; Fig. 2). The mean number of the initial cases
reported was 104.4 and the standard deviation was 120.8.
When the current outbreak was discovered, 80 cases were
reported. This was within one standard deviation of case
counts at time of discovery.
Economic Results
Table 4 indicates the discounted expected costs of an
optimal SICP strategy are substantial (* $10.5 billion), but
the benefits (* $18.5 billion) exceed these costs so that the
expected net benefit of avoiding an outbreak is positive and
quite large (* $8 billion). Comparison of the steady-state
values with the initial values indicates that much of the
costs and benefits are borne over the longer run, although
initial investment costs are large (10% of the present value
of total costs over time). This highlights the fact that SICP
is a long-run strategy that requires a large initial investment
followed by smaller but continual annual expenditures in
return for benefits that accrue over the far distant future.
This means that short-sighted, reactive responses to disease
outbreaks may be highly inefficient.
The baseline scenario indicates a large initial invest-
ment relative to the steady-state value of capital, N*. The
capital stock grows gradually for about 15–20 years after
this initial investment before converging to its steady-state
value, with investments declining during this period
(Fig. 3a, b). These investments have the effect of driving the
hazard rate well below the initial background level and
keeping it there, even as the background hazard almost
doubles over time (Fig. 3c). The hazard rate does increase
as the background rate increases, but the SICP investments
Table 2. Linear Effect of Population Density.
Estimate SE t value Pr(> |t|)
Intercept 3677.017 4902.372 0.75 0.482
Region population density 5,084,678 81.81966 0.01 0.995
Linear regression of final case count on regional population density demonstrate no linear relationship between the regional population density (independent
variable) and final outbreak size (number of cases, dependent variable).
Fig. 1. A scatter plot of the total number of cases against regional
population density shows no obvious relationship between the
population density of the area where the outbreak is initially
discovered and the final number of cases.
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keep these increases small in comparison with changes in
the background rate.
Of our eight sensitivity analyses (Table 4), scenarios 1
and 2 investigate the effect of different levels of investment
required to eliminate risk, Nmax. The larger the value of
Nmax, the less responsive is the hazard rate to SICP capital
and the more expensive it becomes to manage outbreak
risks. Our results indicate that a slightly larger value
(* 13.3% increase) leads to a small increase in optimal
SICP investments, with total costs increasing and net
benefits declining by a significantly larger amount due to
the fact that an outbreak is more likely (e.g., the steady-
state hazard rate has increased by 25% relative to the
baseline). For the opposite case when lower levels of
investment are required to eliminate risk in scenario 2 (a
90% decrease in Nmax), investment is significantly more
efficient and is reduced by 50% in the long-run, costs de-
cline by 66%, and net benefits of avoiding an outbreak rise
by 71%. These results suggest SICP investments are not
very sensitive to small-to-moderate changes in Nmax, but
could be sensitive to extreme changes.
Scenarios 3 and 4 examine alternative values of the
steady-state background hazard rate, b*. Although these
scenarios represent a 40% increase and decrease relative to
the baseline value, investment levels, costs and net benefits
do not change substantially. The results are not sensitive to
changes in b* (Table 4).
Scenario 5 examines a 25% across-the-board reduction
in expected damage estimates associated with an outbreak.
Here we find that investments and costs drop by about 12–
15%, whereas the net benefits of SICP fall by 18–20%.
These results suggest that optimal investment strategies and
outcomes are fairly sensitive to the expected damages of an
outbreak, as might be expected.
Scenarios 6 and 7 investigate the impact of self-insur-
ance from capital investments. Specifically, scenario 6
investigates the extreme case where capital provides no self-
insurance, whereas scenario 7 examines a case where self-
insurance is more responsive to capital investments. In
scenario 6 we find that investment increases substantially,
particularly in the long run, to promote prevention (as
indicated by the small steady-state hazard rate) since
damages remain large in the absence of self-protection.
Costs increase significantly, as do the benefits of avoiding
an outbreak. The opposite occurs when SICP provides
more self-insurance. These results indicate that self-insur-
ance plays a significant role in formulating an optimal
management strategy.
Finally, scenario 8 examines the role of larger main-
tenance or operating costs associated with SICP capital. In
this scenario, we doubled the unit cost relative to the
baseline. As expected, investment declines significantly
while costs still increase relative to the baseline. The drop in
investment results in a larger hazard rate, which increases
the benefits of reducing an outbreak, at least at the onset of
management. In the steady state, we find costs have in-
creased so much that the benefits of avoiding an outbreak
are reduced.
DISCUSSION
Our epidemiological results suggest that the 2013–2015 W.
African Ebola outbreak was not structurally different from
other smaller Ebola virus disease outbreaks and that factors
other than population density or immediacy of global alert
(e.g., border movement issues) played a greater role in
leading to significantly higher numbers of cases (Carroll
et al. 2015; Kramer et al. 2016). This provides context to
Table 3. Linear Effect from Initial Cases
Estimate SE t value Pr(> |t|)
Intercept 4985.72 5845.165 0.85 0.433
Initial Cases - 7.671737 38.19996 - 0.2 0.849
Linear regression of final case count on initial case count demonstrates no
linear relationship between initial reported case counts (independent
variable) and final case counts (dependent variable).
Fig. 2. A scatter plot of total cases against initial cases at time of
discovery shows no obvious relationship between the two. This
implies that discovering an outbreak later is not necessarily tied to
more final cases.
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our economic model and informs the suggested policy re-
sponse through how we think about the probability of
future pandemic outbreaks. Models of the 2013–2015 epi-
demic’s early growth dynamics (Kiskowski 2014) suggest
that we should expect no strong linear association between
population density and final outbreak size. These models
also lend weight to the notion that the proportion of
outbreaks which are large may increase in the future.
Community and household structure modulates the effect
of population density on disease transmission (Kiskowski
2014). The stochastic nature of epidemics sees many
(around 40%) initial outbreaks burn out with fewer than
150 cases. With small community mixing sizes (e.g., C = 5
outside-of-household contacts per individual), the distri-
bution of epidemic size is skewed toward smaller numbers
of cases. As community mixing size increases (representing
more urbanized environments), the distribution of epi-
demic size becomes bimodal, with almost all epidemics
which reach the survival threshold seeing over 1000 cases.
This implies that while the 2013–2015 outbreak was not
significantly different from past outbreaks, the increased
interconnectedness of the area which it occurred in led to a
larger overall outbreak. This is of course only one driver of
the increased risk of an outbreak, and we can also consider
land use change and climate change to be possible drivers.
This is consistent with the 2013–2015 outbreak, where a
major city (Conakry) was affected early in the outbreak [by
the end of May 2014 when there were still less than 300
cases (World Health Organization 2014b)], whereas pre-
vious Ebola outbreaks were successfully contained in less
densely populated areas. This may be because human
populations at the region of origin have higher relative
connectivity, pushing the virus more rapidly into urban
areas (Wesolowski et al. 2014).
Our economic analysis suggests that US funding levels
proposed and allocated after the Ebola outbreak may have
been large enough to combat future threats (Tables 5 and
6). However, the portion of funding allocated to SICP
remains unclear and may not adequately reflect the benefits
of SICP. By contrast, the pandemic fund proposed by
WHO is correctly positioned for SICP but woefully inad-
equate. We find that a standing capital prevention stock of
$970 million could provide expected savings of $10.3 bil-
lion in reduced costs from avoiding expected future
emerging disease impacts. Maintaining this stock at a
steady state, however, would require annual investments of
$48.5 million. That represents a significant amount of
funding by donors, and one that would be politically
challenging. We argue that this would be best structured as
a pre-outbreak investment in strengthening existing SICP
networks, e.g., through the WHO Global Outbreak Alert
Fig. 3. Time paths of key variables in the baseline scenario. The
panels depict the time (t, shown on the horizontal axis) paths of the
following variables in the cost-minimizing outcome prior to a future
Ebola-like outbreak: a SICP capital stock, N, b investments, n, and c
the hazard rate, w (solid), and background hazard rate, b (dashed).
We assume initial capital stocks are negligible and that the initial
background hazard rate is 2.6% and growing. Discontinuities at time
t = 0 stem from a large initial investment in N (since N(0) = 0),
which immediately increases N and decreases the hazard rate from
the initial background level of b(0) = 0.026. After this initial
investment, smaller investments in SICP are required to increase
the capital stock as the background risk level increases to its steady-
state value, after which investments only occur to offset the effects of
depreciation. The investments mitigate the increased background
hazard as the hazard rate remains much smaller than, and increase
less quickly than, the background rate.
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and Response Network (GOARN). This could involve
strengthening GOARN to explicitly fund a reserve of mo-
bile staff, equipment and laboratory capacity coupled with
annual investments to maintain and expand this reserve
over time. Staff and equipment could be deployed to
leverage existing capacity in developing nations and
emerging infectious disease hotspots (Allen et al. 2017).
This also supports other calls for reform of national health
capacities, including construction of a global health work-
force reserve and investment in international health sys-
tems (Gostin and Friedman 2015).
There is a clear need for greater clarity on the intended
and final use of funds for pandemic prevention, and for
more detailed analysis of their potential return-on-invest-
ment. The $5.4 Billion US Presidential budget request lacks
clarity on how much funding was allocated to capacity
building efforts, and the original request had $1.54 billion
placed in a contingency fund for long-term efforts (The
White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014). The
Department of Health and Human Services released some
details of their budget request, laying out a series of mea-
sures that addressed capacity building within the CDC
allocation (Department of Health and Human Services
2015) (Tables 5 and 6). While this represented an advance
toward building the preventive capital stock necessary for
long-term Ebola prevention, without a direct commitment
to development of a mobile outbreak prevention force and
annual support to maintain this capacity, it was likely less
than optimal. Our findings demonstrate the WHO’s pro-
posed $100 million pandemic fund is too small to ade-
quately prevent future Ebola outbreaks and supports
analysis and call for reforms (Gostin and Friedman 2015).
Our economic modeling suggests a more effective way
to allocate these resources is to maintain a fund large en-
Table 6. Ebola Spending. Health and Human Services Ebola Emergency Funding Spending Plan (Jan. 2015; Sylvia 2015).
Budget Activity Amount (in
billions)
Purpose
CDC 1.77 International and domestic response and preparedness; restore and strengthen
capacities of health systems; build emergency operations centers; provide equipment
and training to test patients; build capacities of laboratories to test specimens
Public Health and Social Ser-
vices Emergency Fund
0.733 Develop and support research on Ebola vaccine and therapeutic candidates; hospital
preparedness, equipment, training, care and transportation needs; reimburse
domestic transportation and treatment costs for individuals treated in US for Ebola;
procure necessary medical countermeasures
National Institutes of Health 0.238 Conduct clinical trials of vaccine candidates; discover new vaccines, therapeutics, and
diagnostics
Food and Drug Administration 0.025 Conduct product review, development, and evaluation of Ebola vaccines; provide
regulatory and scientific advice to stakeholders; develop medical devices and facil-
itate IVD development; facilitate clinical trials and product manufacturing; manage
inter- and intra-agency activities related to Ebola; fund travel, lab supplies, and IT
expenses; fund research for medical product safety, efficacy, and quality
Total 2.8
Table 5. Ebola Funding Allocations.
Ebola allocation
Department Amount ($ in billions)
HHS 2.742
USAID and Department of State 2.5
Department of Defense 0.112
FDA 0.025
NIH 0.238
$6.18 billion was requested by the White House for Ebola emergency
funding in November 2014 (The White House Office of the Press Secretary
2014). $5.4 billion was allocated by the US Congress (Mikulski 2015). The
funding request included $4.6 billion for immediate response consisting of
investments to fortify domestic public health systems, contain and mitigate
the epidemic in West Africa, speed procurement and testing of vaccines and
therapeutics and reduce the risk to Americans by building prevention and
detection capacity in vulnerable countries. It also established a $1.54 billion
contingency fund to ensure resources were available as the situation evolved,
support domestic control efforts, expand monitoring, vaccinate healthcare
workers and enhance global health security efforts. The funding that was
actually allocated is shown below. All funds are immediately available for
use, and none are held in a contingency fund.
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ough to allocate mobile resources during an outbreak and
provide ongoing value between outbreaks. Previous articles
have likened pandemic prevention to military activities
(Time Inc 2015), and there has been a growing interest in,
and funding to support global health threats as concomi-
tant threats to security (Global Health Security Agenda
2018). While there are clear moral and ethical differences
between wars and pandemics, this metaphor has economic
cogency—for military and pandemic threats, investing in
internationally-based rapidly deployable human resources
coupled with strengthening of in-country infrastructure
and capacity to curtail new events is economically optimal
(Gostin and Friedman 2015). Defense departments use
these approaches to counter global security threats. They
create an overseas surge capacity (a ‘standing army’) and
build alliances with partner nations, which include pro-
viding additional capacity to those partners. They also
develop tactics to avoid redundancy in peace time. For
EIDs, this could consist of trained responders based in
regions prone to emerging diseases, with reservists sta-
tioned in donor countries. These international allies would
be deployed first through networks like the Global Out-
break Alert and Response Network (GOARN)—with sig-
nificantly improved capacity. In the West African Ebola
outbreak, international aid funds were used to supply
equipment and staff to enhance clinical and diagnostic
capacity, to purchase personal protective equipment, in-
crease biosecurity, and more rapidly develop and test vac-
cines and therapeutic agents (e.g., Butler 2014). These
measures appear to have been ultimately successful. But
without continued funding, capacity building investments
depreciate over time, making them temporary in nature. In
addition, if these resources were already deployed overseas
before the outbreak, they may have been distributed faster.
This leads to a health economics dilemma: the strategy
of responding to risks with a sudden increase in the flow of
prevention spending—treating the control of the outbreak
risk as a temporary flow that we can wait out—may be
inadequate. A global pandemic fund, structured to produce
a networked ‘standing army’ with international reservists to
combat EIDs and to support ongoing costs of maintenance
avoids this problem. This approach seems to reflect the
goals of WHO GOARN (World Health Organization 2018).
A straightforward solution to the pandemic threat may be a
better-funded GOARN with a line item commitment for
donor funding that cannot be significantly degraded be-
tween outbreaks or in global recessions, as seems to have
occurred prior to the recent Ebola outbreak (Gostin and
Friedman 2015; Heymann et al. 2015). This could be en-
hanced with a formal link to in-country programs that use
development aid to build capacity to counter the pandemic
threat (Gostin and Friedman 2015). Examples recently
proposed include the FAO-OIE-WHO ‘‘One Health’’ ap-
proach to building biosecurity around livestock farms in
countries where prior influenza outbreaks have originated
(World Bank 2008), and the USAID ‘‘Emerging Pandemic
Threats’’ program that targets novel and known emerging
zoonoses in EID hotspots (Morse et al. 2012). While an
international network of reservist experts would be needed
to support this approach, a focus on building a standing
army of local first-responders in at risk nations built
around EID hotspots would logically provide the best
allocation of resources. It also suggests that continued
funding for global health security in countries at high risk
of pandemic emergence could be a critical step to opti-
mizing prevention and response to their threat (Global
Health Security Agenda 2018).
The proposed levels of investment in our analysis
should be taken as a lower bound. Many prevention
activities that reduce the probability of an uncontrolled
Ebola may also provide broader benefits to health and
economic development. For instance, investment in pre-
vention capital that includes hospitals can also provide
healthcare services to local populations and build trust in
local institutions—basic requirements for economic
development. This would act as an additional benefit of
capital, so that the optimal amount of investment in pre-
vention rises until the total marginal benefit is equal to the
marginal cost of funds. This could be a result of extending
the focus from global health security to individual health
security (Heymann et al. 2015). When we consider the
impact of resources invested in affordable care in devel-
oping countries and the protection of developed nations,
the benefits of prevention are greater, which suggests a
strategy of even more investment.
Like major earthquakes or category 5 hurricanes,
pandemics emerge stochastically from a background of
frequent EID events that are predominantly zoonotic in
nature and originate in tropical countries (Jones et al.
2008). These events are increasing in frequency as their
underlying socioeconomic and environmental drivers ex-
pand (Jones et al. 2008). Furthermore, progressively glob-
alized patterns of travel and trade result in an increasing
risk of each new outbreak becoming a pandemic (Hosseini
et al. 2010). This leads to a straightforward economic
problem—there is an interval of time within which we
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must launch an effective global effort to pre-empt future
events. If we wait too long, the probability of an outbreak
accelerates and may lead to preemptive action being
unfeasible or obsolete (Pike et al. 2014). Thus, while the
deliberations on the size and nature of the WHO pandemic
fund continue, the US government appropriation for Ebola
response was used to combat to the outbreak of Zika virus,
and depleted as a reserve for future pandemics. We there-
fore urge that a collective global strategy to combat future
emerging disease threats is urgently formed, based on
sound economic analysis, and focused on the countries
where future emerging diseases are most likely to originate.
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APPENDIX
Note that the current conditional Hamiltonian, henceforth
called the Hamiltonian, in Eq. (6) represents a linear con-
trol problem. The optimal choice of n depends on the sign





¼ 0 iff n ¼ n
<0 iff n ¼ n̂
8<
: ðA1Þ
where n* is the singular value of n (i.e., an interior,
unconstrained solution). This condition says no invest-
ments should occur when the marginal benefit of SICP
investments (- q1) is less than the marginal cost of
investment (unity), and investments should occur at a
maximum level when the marginal benefit of SICP
investments exceeds the marginal cost of investment. The
singular solution should occur when the marginal benefits
and costs of investment are equated.
The remaining necessary conditions for an optimum
are given by the following adjoint conditions
_q1 ¼ r þ w N; bð Þ þ d½ q1  CN Nð Þ  JXN Nð Þw N; bð Þ
 JX Nð Þ þ q2½ wN N; bð Þ;
ðA2Þ
_q2 ¼ r þ w N; bð Þ½ q2 þ nþ C Nð Þ þ JX Nð Þw N; bð Þ; ðA3Þ
_k ¼ r þ w N; bð Þ  rb bð Þ½ k JX Nð Þ þ q2½ wb N; bð Þ;
ðA4Þ
and also the state equations. Together, conditions (A1)–
(A4) and the state Eqs. (1), (2) and (5) determine cost-
minimizing behavior through time.




nþ C Nð Þ þ JXw N; bð Þð Þer vtð Þydv: ðA5Þ
From (A5), - q2 is the present value of expected costs,
at time t, conditional on an outbreak having not yet oc-
curred. Define Z = (JX(N) + q2). This expression repre-
sents the difference between the certain costs of an outbreak
(JX) and the expected costs continuing along the pre-out-
break prevention path (- q2). Hence, Z is the expected
increase in costs from transitioning from the pre-outbreak
to post-outbreak state at time t. Alternatively, Z is the ex-
pected cost savings (i.e., a net benefit) from continuing
along the pre-outbreak path as opposed to transitioning to
the post-outbreak state. The term Z must be positive
(Z > 0); otherwise the post-outbreak costs would be less
than preventing an outbreak and it would be optimal to
transition sooner. In what follows we treat Z as a state
variable that changes over time according to
_Z ¼ JXN Nð Þ _N þ _q2
¼ JXN Nð Þ n dN½  þ r þ w N; bð Þ½  Z  JX Nð Þ½ 
þ nþ C Nð Þ þ JX Nð Þw N; bð Þ
ðA6Þ
We proceed by examining the singular solution. In this
case, (A1) yields
q1 ¼ 1 ðA7Þ
Time differentiating this condition yields _q1 ¼ 0.
Substituting this result into adjoint condition (A2) leads to
the relation
1 ¼ wN N; bð ÞZ  JXN Nð Þw N; bð Þ  CN Nð Þ
r þ w N; bð Þ þ d : ðA8Þ
The LHS is the marginal cost of investment in SICP
and provides the measuring stick against which the mar-
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ginal benefits of investment in prevention must be weighed.
The cost-minimizing solution requires marginal costs to
equal the annuity value of the net marginal benefits of the
prevention stock (RHS) using a risk- and depreciation-
adjusted discount factor. The net marginal benefits (the
RHS numerator) include the expected reduced marginal
cost of an outbreak due to a reduction in the likelihood of
an outbreak (- wN(N, b)Z) and reduced damages due to
self-protection (- JXN(N)w(N, b)), less the marginal
maintenance cost of SICP capital. Condition (A8) implic-
itly defines the singular value of Z as
Z N; bð Þ ¼ r þ w N; bð Þ þ dþ JXN Nð Þw N; bð Þ þ CN Nð ÞwN N; bð Þ
ðA9Þ
which is a feedback response to the states N and b. Time
differentiating this relation and setting it equal to (A6)
yields
JXN Nð Þ n dN½  þ r þ w N; bð Þ½  Z N; bð Þ  JX Nð Þ½ 
þ nþ C Nð Þ þ JX Nð Þw N; bð Þ
¼ ZN n dN½  þ Zbr bð Þ
ðA10Þ
Condition (A10) can be solved for the singular value of
n as the feedback relation
n N;bð Þ¼ dN
þ rJX Nð ÞdN rþw N;bð Þ½ Z N;bð ÞC Nð Þð ÞþZb N;bð Þr bð Þ
1þ JXN Nð ÞZN N;bð Þ
ðA11Þ
The dynamics of the optimized system are determined
by the system
_b ¼ r bð Þ; and _N ¼ n N; bð Þ  dN; ðA12Þ
where the new state equation for N is obtained by substi-
tuting in the feedback rule for n into the original state
equation. The dynamics in (A12) provide insight into the
singular value n(N,b). Specifically, n(N,b) equals its steady-
state value dN plus an adjustment term reflecting the fact
that, away from the steady state with r(b) = 0, b changes
over time. Changes in b generate two effects arising in the
numerator of the second RHS term in (A11). Using the
approach outlined in ‘‘Appendix’’ from (29), the first term
in the numerator (in parentheses) equals the value of
changes in b, which is kr(b). The second term in the
numerator is the effect of changes in b on the singular value
of Z. These numerator terms vanish in the steady state with
n = dN and r(b) = 0. In particular, the first RHS numer-
ator term in (A11) vanishes to yield:
Z N; bð Þ ¼ rJX Nð Þ  dN þ C Nð Þ½ 
r þ w N; bð Þ : ðA13Þ
The RHS numerator of condition (A13) is the flow
value of damages, rJX(N), less the costs of SICP investment
and maintenance prior to the outbreak, dN + C(N). The
denominator is a risk-adjusted discount rate. The RHS is
the risk-adjusted perpetuity value of cost savings from
avoiding an outbreak. Condition (A13) says this perpetuity
value optimally equals the steady-state net cost savings
from avoiding an outbreak, Z(N,b).
The dynamics can be explored more fully by drawing a
phase plane in (N,b) space, presented in Figure 4 for the
baseline scenario. We begin by defining the isoclines asso-
ciated with the singular solution. The _b ¼ 0 isocline is
r(b) = 0, which is a horizontal line. The _N ¼ 0 isocline is
defined by setting the RHS numerator in (A11) equal to
zero. Individually, these isoclines indicate where the indi-
cated state variable is unchanging, given the current value
Fig. 4. Phase plane for the baseline scenario. The phase plane depicts
the dynamics of how the variables N and b move together over time
(where N is expressed in billions of US dollars). The intersection of
the _N ¼ 0 and _b ¼ 0 isoclines produces a saddle point steady-state
equilibrium at point P, which is optimally pursued by following path
p. Given the initial value of b(0) = 0.026, the initial investment n(0)
should be made to bring the capital stock up to N(0+). Future
investments should then be made to keep N on path p as b increases
over time.
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of the other state variable. A steady state for both state
variables occurs at the intersection of the isoclines. Off the
isoclines, movement occurs as directed by the phase arrows.
Figure 1a indicates there is a single steady state, at point P,
which found numerically (i.e., using eigenvalues) to be a
saddle point equilibrium. The singular solution consists of
separatrices (also known as a saddle path), labeled p, to the
steady state.
We assume the initial value of b is 0.026, as indicated
by b(0) on the phase plane. We also assume in our
numerical analyses that N(0) = 0. This means an initial
investment of N(0+) is required, which moves us to the
indicated point on the saddle path p. Once on path p, the
optimal strategy is to remain on the path. This involves
making investments n to adjust N to stay on the path as b
changes over time.
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